[Solaris] -- Security Vulnerability May Allow Users With the "File System Management" RBAC Profile to Gain Elevated Privileges

Sun(sm) Alert Notification
     * Sun Alert ID: 102514
     * Synopsis: Security Vulnerability May Allow Users With the "File
       System Management" RBAC Profile to Gain Elevated Privileges
     * Category: Security
     * Product: Solaris 9 Operating System, Solaris 8 Operating System
     * BugIDs: 4742992
     * Avoidance: Patch, Workaround
     * State: Resolved
     * Date Released: 21-Aug-2006
     * Date Closed: 21-Aug-2006
     * Date Modified:

1. Impact

   A security vulnerability in the default Role-Based Access Control
   (RBAC, see rbac(5)) configuration associated with the "File System
   Management" profile may allow a local user who has been assigned that
   profile to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the
   "root" user.

   In addition, a security vulnerability in the format(1M) command may
   allow a local user who has been granted the "File System Management"
   RBAC profile (or any custom profile which would allow the user to run
   the format(1M) command with "root" privileges) to write to the device
   files associated with local disks with the privileges of the root
   user.

2. Contributing Factors

   These issues can occur in the following releases:

   SPARC Platform
     * Solaris 8 without patch 108975-10
     * Solaris 9 without patch 113072-08

   x86 Platform
     * Solaris 8 without patch 108976-10
     * Solaris 9 without patch 114423-07

   Notes:
    1. Solaris 10 is not impacted by this issue.
    2. These issues are only present when at least one non-root user on
       the system has been granted a profile allowing them to run the
       format(1M) command with root privileges, for example, the "File
       System Management" profile.

   The assignment of profiles to users is configured in the user_attr(4)
   database. For example, if the host is configured to only use a local
   file for this database, users with the "File System Management"
   profile can be identified with a command such as the following:
    $ grep 'File System Management' /etc/user_attr

   For hosts which are configured via nsswitch.conf(4) to use a source
   other than a local file for the user_attr(4) database, please refer to
   the relevant documentation for that source (for example, ldap(1),
   ypfiles(4) or nis+(1)).

   To determine if an individual user has been granted a profile which
   contains the format(1M) command, the profiles(1) command can be used
   as in the following example:
    $ profiles -l testuser | grep /usr/sbin/format
      usr/sbin/format    uid=0

   If the host is configured to only use a local file for the
   exec_attr(4) database, a command similar to the following can be run
   to determine which profiles grant privileged access to the format(1M)
   utility:
    $ grep format /etc/security/exec_attr
    File System Management:suser:cmd:::/usr/sbin/format:euid=0

   For hosts which are configured via nsswitch.conf(4) to use a source
   other than a local file for the exec_attr(4) database, please refer to
   the relevant documentation for that source (for example, ypfiles(4) or
   nis+(1)).

3. Symptoms

   There are no predictable symptoms that would indicate this issue has
   been exploited to gain elevated privileges or to write to a host's
   disks.

4. Relief/Workaround

   To work around these issues until patches can be applied, remove
   references to the 'format' command from the exec_attr(4) database.
   (However, this will result in those users no longer being granted
   privileged access to the format command).

   For example, if the host is configured to only use a local file for
   the exec_attr(4) database, a '#' symbol can be inserted at the
   beginning of lines in the "/etc/security/exec_attr" file which
   reference the 'format' command:
    $ grep /usr/sbin/format /etc/security/exec_attr
    #File System Management:suser:cmd:::/usr/sbin/format:euid=0

   For hosts which are configured via nsswitch.conf(4) to use a source
   other than a local file for the exec_attr(4) database, please refer to
   the relevant documentation for that source (for example, ypfiles(4) or
   nis+(1)).

5. Resolution

   These issues are addressed in the following releases:

   SPARC Platform
     * Solaris 8 with patch 108975-10 or later
     * Solaris 9 with patch 113072-08 or later

   x86 Platform
     * Solaris 8 with patch 108976-10 or later
     * Solaris 9 with patch 114423-07 or later

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